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The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing 
individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large 
sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of 
intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks 
highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating belief-
bias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also 
performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in 
line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both 
contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were 
significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences 
in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general 
(r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be 
observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary 
conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' 
characteristics.  
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Categorical syllogisms1 are characterized as one of the fruit flies (De Neys, 
2012), key methods (Evans, 2003), or paradigm cases (Evans, 2008) for 
demonstrating dual processing in reasoning. In standard paradigm, people are asked 
to evaluate logical validity of given conclusions, with conclusions' validity (whether 
they logically follow from premises or not) and believability (whether they are 
consistent with prior beliefs or not) being systematically manipulated across items. 
As a consequence, some tasks are non-conflict (valid-believable and invalid-
unbelievable), and some are conflict (invalid-believable and valid-unbelievable). The 
main experimental finding within this paradigm is belief bias – a prevalent tendency 
to evaluate syllogism based on conclusion's believability rather than on its logical 
validity (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983).  
The central assumption of dual process theories (DPT) is that human reasoning 
rests on interplay between two distinct types of thinking - type 1 (intuitive) and type 
2 (analytical) cognitive processing. Type 1 processes are usually described as fast, 
effortless, and associative. According to Evans and Stanovich (2013), their defining 
characteristic is autonomy (type 1 are carried out whenever a triggering stimulus is 
encountered), along with independence from working memory (WM) capacity. On 
the other hand, type 2 processes require WM resources and involve cognitive 
decoupling, which seems to be crucial for mental simulation and hypothetical 
thinking. This makes type 2 processes relatively slow and resource-demanding.  
What makes syllogisms attractive for DPT are differences between conflict and 
non-conflict tasks. Latter exemplify the situation in which the outcomes of two 
processes, one supporting belief-based response, and the other leading to logic-based 
response, are unison. However, in some situations, such as those represented by 
conflict syllogisms, two processes are supposed to lead to different outcomes, thus 
creating fertile ground for studying the ongoing competition for control over the 
response.  
 
Traditional Dual-Process View on Syllogistic Reasoning 
 
Within default-interventionist DPT account (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Stanovich, 2009), two conflicting processes are seen to be of two distinct types. 
More precisely, type 1 cues a response based on believability of conclusion, the kind 
                                                          
1 Categorical syllogisms are deductive arguments that relate three terms: minor (A), middle 
(B) and major (C). Syllogisms consist of three statements - two premises and a conclusion. 
Each statement contains standard logical quantifier (A – all, E – no, I – some, O – some ... are 
not), and their combination determine mood of syllogism (there are 64 possible combinations, 
43). There are also four possible figures for syllogisms. Assuming that conclusion can have 
either A-C or C-A form, the premises may reference the terms as AB-BC, AB-CB, BA-BC, 
or BA-BC. Each mood can appear in each of four figures, making 512 possible syllogisms.  
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of response that leads to incorrect response on conflict tasks. In order to override it, 
one needs to inhibit belief-based intuition, to initiate more demanding type 2 
processing, and to successfully perform it through cognitive decoupling and mental 
manipulation. Such operations are resource demanding, and DPT predicts that 
success in their performing will depend mainly on WM capacities.  
Indeed, previous studies have shown that individual differences in WM 
capacities predict response accuracy on the conflict tasks, but not on non-conflict 
ones (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 
2004; Quayle & Ball, 2000). To experimentally test this relation, De Neys (2006) 
introduced a secondary dot-memory task which puts some load on WM. In line with 
the expectation, burdening cognitive resources did not affect performance on non-
conflict tasks, but it did markedly decrease response accuracy on conflict items. 
Further on, considering the high degree of overlap in individual difference of WM 
tasks and individual differences in measures of intelligence (e.g. Colom, Rebollo, 
Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, & Kyllonen, 2004), negative correlation between IQ and 
reasoning performance was both expected (Evans, 2012; Stanovich, 2009), and 
previously observed (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Sá, 
West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000; Torrens, Thompson, & 
Cramer, 1999).  
Nevertheless, relying solely on cognitive ability measures to explain response 
accuracy on conflict reasoning tasks neglects an aspect of human rationality which 
concerns a disposition to initiate type 2 processing, i.e. to detect the need to think 
harder. This faculty is often referred to as reflectivity (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Stanovich, 2009). While cognitive ability refers to the capacity to sustain decoupled 
representations for purposes of mental simulation (that is, to successfully carry out 
type 2 processing), cognitive reflection is more concerned with mere willingness to 
engage type 2 processing (that is, to rethink the problem before providing any 
response). Previous body of research has detected reliable individual differences in 
syllogistic reasoning tasks performance once intelligence has been controlled for, 
and showed that cognitive reflection predicts them, measured by both self-rating 
scales, such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition (Kokis, 
Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), 
and performance-based tests, such as Frederick's (2005) cognitive reflection test 
(Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014).  
 
Recent Dual-Process Views on Syllogistic Reasoning 
 
Recently, the classic assumption regarding to belief-logic conflict as a battle 
between type 1 and type 2 processes has been called into question (De Neys, 
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013). 
What is rather the case, according to De Neys' group, is that conflict occurs on the 




intuitive level, between two type 1 processes. One is the traditional, i.e. heuristic 
intuitive response based on believability of conclusion. The other one, termed logical 
intuitive response, is grounded on the basic apprehension of logical principles. 
Traditionally considered to be an outcome of effortful reasoning, logic-based 
response is now assumed to be cued implicitly and automatically. Such claim that 
people are intuitive logicians (De Neys, 2012, 2014, 2018; De Neys & Bonnefon, 
2013) is certainly bald, yet well-founded. Considerable amount of evidence, based 
on studies designed to contrast various behavioral and physiological measures (such 
as response latencies, confidence ratings, skin conductance, eye movements, 
activation of specific brain regions, etc.) on incorrectly solved conflict tasks in 
comparison to correctly solved non-conflict tasks, strongly indicate that people are 
generally sensitive to conflict between competing intuitive responses, even when 
they fail to provide correct solution. Consistent results observed on different 
reasoning tasks (including bat-and-ball problem and tasks typically employed to 
demonstrate base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and ratio bias) and reported by 
independent research groups (for literature review, see De Neys, 2014) suggest that 
people show metacognitive awareness of a failure to conform to logic when 
responding incorrectly to conflict items.  
Sensitivity to conflict between two intuitive responses in the presented study 
was examined by using confidence rating measures. In line with previous research 
within the area that employed the same measures (Brisson, Schaeken, Markovits, & 
De Neys, 2018; De Neys et al., 2011, 2013), it was expected that confidence ratings 
will be lower for incorrectly solved conflict syllogisms relative to correctly solved 
non-conflict syllogisms. This expectation and corresponding findings can be also 
viewed from the perspective of wider meta-reasoning framework as an evidence that 
people are able to identify if they have made a mistake on reasoning tasks which 
contain conflict between correct and misleading response (see e.g. Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2017).  
Although primarily observed on a group level, results on logical intuition have 
recently been explored within the paradigm of individual differences. This line of 
research is still in its early phase, and at least two questions need to be distinguished 
here. The initial one was whether there are any individual differences in sensitivity 
to conflict detection? Empirical evidence unequivocally lead to the positive answer 
(for the first wave of empirical demonstrations, see Mevel et al., 2015, and 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). The second question is whether those who 
detect conflict also show a higher probability of responding correctly to conflict 
items, that is, is there a positive correlation between conflict detection and reasoning 
performance. Findings regarding this question are rather mixed, with some studies 
showing correlation (e.g. Frey, Johnson, & De Neys, 2018, Study 1 and Study 3b; 
Mevel et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015; Swan, Calvillo, & Revlin, 2018, Study 1; 
see also Mata, Schubert, & Ferreira, 2014 and Mata, Ferreira, Voss, & Kollei, 2017 
for evidences on relation between conflict detection and response accuracy by using 
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somewhat different paradigm), and the others that failed to reveal such relation (e.g. 
Frey et al., 2018, Study 3b; Swan et al., 2018, Study 2). 
Pennycook's group was among the firsts ones which provided evidence on 
conflict detection failures (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012) and also who 
considered conflict detection as one of the sources of type 2 processing (Pennycook 
et al., 2015). In addition to conflict detection, these authors proposed another measure 
which can be derived from indirect measures (such as response times and confidence 
ratings), and it concerns cognitive decoupling. Specifically, they expressed this 
measure as the additional time needed to provide a correct response to conflict items 
as compared to the time spent on non-conflict items. Although it seems plausible to 
suppose how prolonged response time on conflict items for the aim of reaching 
correct response might reflect additional effort that participant puts in order to 
override the intuitive response, it remains unclear why the response time on non-
conflict items should be used as a baseline. Also, scores derived in such a way 
correlated negatively with reasoning performance (Pennycook et al., 2015) or 
showed no significant correlation (Swan et al., 2018).  
In the present study, the measures of cognitive decoupling were expressed as 
differences in confidence ratings for correctly solved conflict items and incorrectly 
solved conflict items. Such scores are supposed to reflect the additional effort needed 
to inhibit heuristic intuitive response after detecting a conflict between two 
responses. Accordingly, higher difference scores should reflect greater cognitive 
decoupling and they should be positively related to response accuracy.  
 
Research Aims and Hypotheses 
 
Study was designed with aim to explore whether response accuracy on conflict 
syllogistic reasoning tasks could be predicted by measures hypothesized in the 
assumptions of default-interventionist account (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Stanovich, 2009) and more recent models which assume intuitive quality of 
belief-logic conflict (De Neys, 2012, 2014, 2018; Pennycook et al., 2015).  
Following the De Neys' (2006) seminal experimental research, but also some 
correlational studies (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004; Handley et al., 2004; Newstead 
et al., 2004; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Sá et al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000; 
Torrens et al., 1999), it was hypothesized that measures of cognitive abilities, such 
as Raven's matrices or vocabulary test, should be related to the performance on 
conflict tasks, but not to the performance on non-conflict tasks. Further on, it was 
expected that cognitive reflection, typically seen as measures of propensity to engage 
type 2 processing, can contribute to our understanding of individual differences in 
reasoning on conflict tasks, over and above intelligence (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014).  
Also, considering mixed results of recent studies (Frey & De Neys, 2017; Frey 
et al., 2018; Pennycook et al., 2015), present research was aimed to examine if there 
is a correlation between conflict sensitivity, measured through confidence ratings, 




and response accuracy. Finally, it was expected that measures of cognitive 
decoupling, also derived from corresponding confidence ratings, will correlate 
positively with performance on conflict items, despite the fact that Pennycook and 
colleagues (2015) reported negative correlation, although for a somewhat different 







The study was part of a wider research on cognitive biases (see Teovanović, 
2013; Teovanović, Knežević, & Stankov, 2015). It involved 247 undergraduate 
students (22 males) from the University of Belgrade who participated in research and 
earned partial course credit in return. Their mean age was 19.82 (SD = 1.29). 




Four types of reasoning task used in the present study are categorical versions 
of modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial the antecedent (DA), and 
affirmation of the consequent (AC) from the propositional logic. Their formal 
structure is presented in the first three columns of Table 1. 
For each task type, four items were derived, with some of them being based on 
examples from previous research (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; Kokis et al., 2002; 
Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999). Two of these were conflict items, in which empirical 
status of conclusion was inconsistent with logical validity of the argument. Other two 
were non-conflict items, in which believability was congruent with the validity. This 
resulted in a total of 16 syllogistic reasoning items, which were presented to 
participants in a predetermined randomized order. Two practice items were 
administered first to ensure participants fully understood the task. 
Participants were asked to evaluate syllogisms, i.e. to indicate whether the 
conclusion follows logically from the two premises. Instruction emphasized that all 
premises should be assumed to be true. No time limit for providing answers was 
imposed. 
Nearly fair level of internal consistency was observed across 16 items (α = .69). 
However, reliability of individual differences in accuracy on conflict (α = .61) and 








After each submitted response, participants were asked to rate how confident 
they were that their response was correct. Confidence ratings were indicated on the 
percentage scale ranging from 50 ("just guessing") to 100 ("absolutely certain") in 
steps of 10. Depending on task conflict status and response accuracy, confidence 
rating scores were used to calculate measures of sensitivity to conflict detection, and 
the amount of cognitive decoupling.  
Conflict Detection. As previously noted, logical intuition account emerged in 
the results evidencing that participants exhibit lower confidence for heuristic intuitive 
answers on conflict items as compared to non-conflict items (De Neys, 2012, 2014). 
To ensure that higher scores indicate more pronounced conflict detection, conflict 
incorrect confidence ratings were subtracted from non-conflict correct ones.  
Bearing in mind considerable noisiness of individual measures of conflict 
detection (see e.g. De Neys, 2018; Frey & De Neys, 2017; Frey et al., 2018; 
Pennycook et al., 2015), absolute difference scores for each participant were divided 
by observed variability of his/her confidence ratings across all items, irrespective of 
task conflict and response accuracy. In such way, they were transformed into a 
measure which holds a resemblance to Cohen's d, and the weight was put on 
differences between corresponding confidence ratings for participants who generally 
showed less variability in confidence ratings. As an additional consequence, 
participants who showed no variability in their confidence ratings at all (n = 16) were 
automatically excluded from further analysis, since their differences scores could not 
be divided by zero. 
Cognitive Decoupling. Cognitive decoupling scores were also calculated in 
such a way to ensure that higher scores indicate a larger amount of cognitive 
decoupling (conflict correct – conflict incorrect). To account for individual 
differences in confidence scores, raw (absolute) differences were divided by intra-
individual SD of confidence ratings. 
 
Other Measures  
 
Raven's Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1979) consist of 18 items. 
Participants' task was to identify the missing symbol which completes the 3x3 matrix 
in the most logical manner by choosing from among five options. The time limit was 
restricted to six minutes. A fair level of internal consistency was observed (α = .79). 
Vocabulary Test (Knežević & Opačić, 2011) has 56 items. Subjects were asked 
to characterize the different words by choosing from among six options. No time 
limit for the completion of this test was imposed. On average, the participants 
completed this test in 13.11 minutes (SD = 2.09). Cronbach's alpha was .73.  
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) consists of only three 
questions, with each of them triggering most of the participants to give an immediate 




and incorrect answer. Due to the small number of items, a low level of internal 




Measures were administered in two sessions, one week apart. Personal 
identification numbers were used for matching participants' data. In the first session, 
participants completed categorical syllogisms in paper and pencil format. In the 





Four participants showed no variability in neither answering (accepted 
conclusions on each item) nor in providing confidence ratings (always expressed 
100% certainty level) on syllogistic reasoning tasks. Their data were discarded from 




Performance on syllogistic reasoning tasks was analyzed first. Results, 
presented in detail in Table 1, indicate that non-conflict MP was the easiest task (M 
= 98.6%, CI95 [97.1 - 99.3]), while conflict AC had the lowest rate of correct 
responses (e.g. only 10.3% of participants concluded that Catfish is a fish do not 
follow logically from All fish have grills and Catfish has grill).  
 
Table 1 
Mean Response Accuracy and Confidence Ratings (with 95%CI) on Syllogistic Reasoning 
Items 






















































All humans are mortal. 
99.2 
[97.1 - 99.8] 
97.86 
[96.97 - 98.75] 
I am a human. 
I am mortal. 
All birds have feathers. 
98.0 
[95.4 - 99.1] 
93.79 
[92.25 - 95.33] 
Robin is a bird. 
















All mammals walk. 
41.7 
[35.7 - 47.9] 
88.31 
[86.22 - 90.40] 
Whales are mammals.  
Whales walk.  
All dogs are tame. 
73.3 
[67.4 - 78.4] 
87.24 
[85.2 - 89.28] 
Pit bulls are dogs. 
Pit bulls are tame. 
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Everything wooden is fuel. 
71.7 
[65.7 - 76.9] 
84.69 
[82.49 - 86.89] 
Gas is not wooden. 
Gas is not fuel. 
Every vegetable is edible. 
74.9 
[69.1 - 79.9] 
87.48 
[85.43 - 89.53] 
Banana is not a vegetable. 














All the African countries are poor. 
36.0 
[30.3 - 42.2] 
87.90 
[86.00 - 89.80] 
Switzerland is not an African country. 
Switzerland is not poor country.  
All seas are salty. 
19.0 
[14.6 - 24.4] 
89.92 
[87.94 - 91.90] 
Danube is not a sea. 
































































All trolleybuses use power. 
83.4 
[78.3 - 87.5] 
92.15 
[90.37 - 93.93] 
Boilers use power. 
Boilers are trolleybuses. 
All dogs go to heaven. 
75.4 
[68.7 - 79.5] 
86.13 
[84.03 - 88.23] 
Believers go to heaven. 














All living beings need water. 
22.7 
[17.9 - 28.3] 
90.08 
[88.31 - 91.85] 
Roses need water. 
Roses are living beings. 
All fish have gills. 
10.9 
[7.6 - 15.4] 
91.85 
[90.18 - 93.52] 
Catfish has gills. 






































All fruits are edible. 
83.8 
[78.7 - 87.9] 
90.99 
[89.27 - 92.71] 
Cigarettes are not edible. 
Cigarettes are not fruits. 
Medit. countries have a coastline. 
82.2 
[76.9 - 86.5] 
86.94 
[84.78 - 89.10] 
Hungary has no coastline. 
















All birds can fly. 
47.4 
[41.2 - 53.6] 
85.72 
[83.55 - 87.89] 
Ostrich cannot fly. 
Ostrich is not a bird. 
All capital cities have subway. 
41.3 
[35.3 - 47.5] 
87.28 
[85.16 - 89.40] 
Belgrade has no subway. 
Belgrade is not a capital city. 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for mean accuracy scores are calculated using Wilson formula.  
 
Two-way ANOVA for repeated measures was run to examine the effects of task 
type and believability-validity conflict. Results, descriptively presented in Figure 1, 
indicate that both task type (F3,726 = 72.95, p < .001, η2 = .23) and task conflict status 




(F1,242 = 525.46, p < .001, η2 = .69) significantly determined response accuracy2. As 
expected, performance dropped rapidly when conflict between believability and 
validity of conclusion was introduced, confirming reliable findings on belief bias 
(Evans et al., 1983). Additionally, valid arguments (MP and MT) were generally 
easier to evaluate in comparison to invalid ones (AC and DA), which is in line with 
previously reported results (Brisson et al., 2018).  
 
 




As results presented in the last two columns of Table 1 show, mean confidence 
ratings across items were consistently higher than response accuracy, except for the 
easiest tasks (non-conflict MP). Nevertheless, confidence ratings were analyzed in 
relation to the task conflict status and response accuracy. For each participant who 
had at least one appropriate data in corresponding cell (that is, who did not give all 
belief-based or all logic-based answers), individual confidence rating scores were 
computed for four conditions that result from crossing the conflict status (conflict vs. 
non-conflict) and response accuracy (correct vs. incorrect). These measures were 
further used as a basis for calculating conflict detection and cognitive decoupling 
measures. Descriptive statistics are presented in the last three rows of Table 2.  
 
 
                                                          
2 Two repeated factors were in low-intensity interaction (F3,726= 24.25, p < .001, η2 = .09). 
Effect of conflict for MP and DA tasks (η2 = .51 and η2 = .53, respectively) was to a certain 
degree weaker in comparison to the same effect for AC task (η2 = .71), but it was stronger 
than conflict effect for MT task (η2 = .39). Such results shed some light on classical finding 
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Table 2 
Correlations among Confidence Rating (CR) Measures as a Function of Task Conflict and 
Response Accuracy, Measures of Cognitive Detection and Cognitive Decoupling (Raw 
Differences), and Response Accuracy (Percentage Correct), Including Means and Standard 
Deviations  
Confidence rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Conflict correct CR - .54*** .56*** .60*** -.06 .71*** .05 .13* 
2. Conflict incorrect CR  - .71*** .42*** -.52*** -.21** .09 .02 
3. Non-conflict correct CR   - .47*** .23** .06 .08 .04 
4. Non-conflict incorrect CR    - .01 .35** -.08 .12 
5. Conflict Detection (3-2)     - .36** -.02 .00 
6. Cognitive Decouple (1- 2)      - -.01 .11 
7. Non-conflict accuracy        - -.26** 
8. Conflict accuracy        - 
N 222 240 243 156 240 219 243 243 
M 85.16 89.98 91.51 80.68 1.47 -4.79 83.45 36.54 
SD 13.92 9.96 8.74 15.82 7.19 12.06 17.75 23.20 




Group measures. As it was expected, average participant showed lower 
confidence on incorrectly solved conflict items (M = 89.98, SD = 9.96) in comparison 
to correctly solved non-conflict items (M = 91.51, SD = 8.74), as predicted by conflict 
detection account (De Neys, 2012, 2014; De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). Although the 
difference was statically significant (F 1, 239 = 10.17, p = .002), it should be noted that 
the effect was relatively small in size (η2 = .04).  
Individual measures. A total of 16 participants were excluded from following 
analyses since they showed no intra-individual variability in confidence rating 
scores. Besides that, three participants gave all correct answers on conflict items, thus 
showing no belief bias. Among 224 participants with valid data, majority (n = 128; 
P = 57.6%) showed expected decrease in the response confidence for conflict 
incorrect items as compared to confidence ratings for non-conflict correct items, with 
the average decrease of 6.02% (SD = 5.93). Nevertheless, there were also 41 (P = 
33%) of biased participants who showed higher confidence (mean increase = 5.66, 
SD = 4.61), and 21 (P = 9.4%) who provided the same rating for both classes of 
items. The last two groups indicate that some participants do not show sensitivity to 
conflict as measured by their confidence scores, which replicates earlier findings 
(Mevel et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015). 





Figure 2. Distribution of conflict detection measures. 
 
Distribution of individual measures of sensitivity to conflict detection is 
presented in Figure 2. In the whole biased sample, reasoning accuracy on conflict 
syllogisms could not be predicted neither by individual conflict detection measures 
(r = .04, p = .57) nor by categorical three-level group factor (F 2, 221 = 2.35, p =.10)3. 
Also, numerical conflict detection measures were not related to response accuracy 
on non-conflict items (r = -.03, p = .62), nor to scores on Raven's matrices (r =.08, p 
= .25), vocabulary test (r =.04, p = .55) and CRT (r = .03, p = .68). The very same 
pattern of results is observed when raw difference scores were used as measures of 
conflict detection. 
 
Cognitive Decoupling  
 
A total of 207 participants gave at least one correct answer to conflict items, 
while three of them had all correct responses (which disallowed the computation of 
difference score). Among 204 subjects, only the minority (n = 67, P = 32.8%) 
showed an increase in confidence after correctly solved conflict items in comparison 
to incorrectly answering them (average increase 6.97, SD = 6.75). On the other hand, 
14 participants (6.9%) showed no difference between two confidence ratings, while 
123 (60.3%) showed a decrease of confidence (M = 12.49, SD = 9.89). These three 
                                                          
3 Within two conflict detection groups (increased vs. decreased confidence), marked 
correlations between measures of conflict detection and reasoning performance were 
observed. Specifically, for the group that showed positive conflict detection, the magnitude 
of conflict detection positively correlated with accuracy (r = .38, p = < .001), which is in line 
with results of previous studies (Mevel et al., 2015). However, for the group that showed 
“inverse” conflict detection, the magnitude of conflict detection correlated negatively with 
accuracy (r = -.23, p = .054).  
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groups ("increase", "same" and "decrease") did not differ in respect to response 
accuracy on conflict items (F 1, 201 = 0.29, p =.75). However, within both "increase" 
and "decrease" cognitive decoupling group, significant relation with performance 
was observed (r = .25, p = .047; r = .33, p < .001; respectively).   
 
Figure 3. Distribution of cognitive decoupling measures. 
 
Numerical measures of cognitive decoupling were related to both response 
accuracy (r = .20, p = .004) and conflict detection (r = .38, p < .001), marginally 
related to scores on Raven's matrices (r = .13, p = .07), and showed no significant 
relation to scores on vocabulary or CRT (rs < .10, ps > .30). Distribution of cognitive 
decoupling measures is presented in Figure 3.  
 
Predictors of Reasoning Accuracy  
 
Final set of analyses aimed to examine if measures of cognitive abilities, 
cognitive reflection, conflict detection, and cognitive decoupling are related to biased 
reasoning.  
Separate bivariate correlations of these measures with performance scores on 
conflict and non-conflict tasks, as well as results of multiple regression analyses are 
presented in Table 3. Results indicate that scores on Raven's matrices, vocabulary 
test, CRT and conflict decoupling were indeed related to achievement on conflict 
items (rs ranged from .18 to .27, ps < .01), but they were not associated with 
performance on non-conflict items (rs < .10, ps > .20). Tests of the difference 
between two dependent correlations with one variable in common (Lee & Preacher, 
2013) was run. One-tailed levels of significance were used considering unidirectional 
expectation that predictors are related to performance on conflict, but not on non-
conflict syllogistic reasoning task. Differences between corresponding correlation 




coefficients were significant in the case of Raven's matrices (Z = 1.72, p = .04), CRT 
(Z = 2.02, p = .02), and cognitive decoupling (Z = 2.73, p = .003).  
 
Table 3 
Results of Performance Prediction for Conflict and Non-Conflict Items 
 Conflict Non-Conflict Test of r difference 
Predictors r β r β Z p (one-tailed) 
Raven's matrices  .25*** .15* .08 .07 1.71 .04 
Vocabulary rest .18** .08 .06 .06 1.19 .12 
Cognitive reflection .27*** .13† .05 .05 2.22 .01 
Conflict detection (n = 224) .02 -.07 -.01 .02 0.66 .25 
Cognitive decoupling (n = 207) .20** .20** -.10 -.12 2.73 .003 
Adjusted R2 8.6% 0.1% 1.71 .04 
Note. †p < .06; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.  
 
In general, cognitive measures accounted for only 0.1% of variance of non-
conflict items score (F 5,198 = 1.01, p = .41), yet their predictive capacity was non-
negligible when predicting scores on conflict items (R2 = 8.6%, F 5, 198 = 4.81, p < 
.001). Significant partial contributions to regression model in the case of conflict 
response accuracy were registered for cognitive decoupling (β = .20, p = .008), 
Raven's matrices (β = .15, p = .036) and also marginally for cognitive reflection (β = 
.14, p = .054), but not for vocabulary (β = .08, p = .28) and conflict detection (β = -
.07, p = .33).  
Finally, hierarchical regression analysis was performed in order to examine if 
there is reliable variance in reasoning, over and above what can be predicted by 
traditional intelligence measures, which can be explained by individual differences 
in cognitive reflection. In the first step, performance scores on eight conflict items 
were regressed on Raven's matrices and vocabulary test, and they accounted for 7.3% 
of the variance (F 2, 240 = 9.40, p < .001). After that, CRT measure was entered, and 





This study was aimed to examine predictors of individual differences in 
reasoning which can be hypothesized by following the basic assumptions of dual 
process theories. To this end, a set of categorical syllogisms was administered, along 
with confidence rating scales and several standard psychometric measures of 
cognitive functioning. Some syllogisms were worded in a way that made 
believability of conclusion consistent with argument validity (so-called control, i.e. 
non-conflict tasks), while some others included belief-logic conflict, either by using 
empirically unbelievable statement as a conclusion of logically valid syllogism or by 
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coupling a believable statement with invalid conclusion. As expected, the conflict 
between conclusion's validity and believability accounted for as much as 71% of 
response accuracy variability. This confirms reliability of belief bias finding, firstly 
reported by Evans et al. (1983) and replicated many times ever since (e.g. De Neys 
et al., 2011; De Neys, & Franssens, 2009; Sá et al., 1999; Stupple & Ball, 2008).  
According to standard default-interventionist DPT account (De Neys, 2006; 
Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich, 2009), when believability and 
validity of conclusion are in accordance, two types of cognitive processes lead to 
correct response, which explains consistently higher performance on non-conflict 
items. However, these two are supposed to cue different responses on conflict 
syllogisms. More precisely, type 1 processes provide a default intuitive response 
(based on believability of conclusion), on which subsequent type 2 might intervene 
in order to override it with more thoughtful reasoning (based on logic rules).  
There are two aspects of type 2 intervention, both amenable to measurement of 
individual differences. The first one is concerned with capability of central executive 
to perform demanding analytical operations, including inhibition of intuitive 
response, cognitive decoupling, mental simulation and hypothetical thinking. 
Individual differences in this capacity are usually expressed through psychometric 
measures of intelligence. In previous studies, higher rates of correct responses on 
conflict syllogisms were indeed related to both measures of WM capacity (Copeland 
& Radvansky, 2004; Handley et al., 2004; Quayle & Ball, 2000), and intelligence 
(Newstead et al., 2004; Sá et al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000; Torrens et al., 
1999). In the present study, scores on Raven's progressive matrices correlated with 
the performance on conflict syllogisms, but not on the non-conflict ones, and this 
difference was found to be statistically significant.  
The same pattern of results was observed in the case of CRT – correlation with 
response accuracy was significantly higher for conflict items in comparison to the 
non-conflict ones. This finding is directly related to the second aspect of presupposed 
type 2 intervention, concerned with the probability of such an intervention. 
Individual differences in detection of the need to engage type 2 processing, expressed 
both through self-rating and performance-based measures, has been shown to predict 
reasoning performance, over and above intelligence (Kokis et al., 2002; Toplak et 
al., 2011, 2014; West et al., 2008). The very same result was observed in the 
presented study, thus confirming the claim that individual differences in rational 
thinking are not reducible to IQ (Stanovich, 2009). 
Probability of type 2 intervention can also be manipulated experimentally, e.g. 
reduced by limiting time allowed for providing response (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005), and by putting the load on working memory capacities (De Neys, 2006), or it 
can be enlarged through presentation of tasks with difficult-to-read font (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). Besides, it has been recently proposed that 
bottom-up (stimulus-related) factors of type 2 processing should be taken into 
account (Pennycook et al., 2015). Within hybrid (De Neys, 2014) and three-stage 




(Pennycook et al., 2015) DPT models, the conflict between responses has been 
conceptualized as a clash between intuitions, rather than between an intuition and a 
thought. Implicit awareness of the belief-logic conflict was demonstrated by showing 
how even biased reasoners implicitly activate basic normative principles, which was 
evidenced by lower confidence or increased response time on incorrectly solved 
conflict items in comparison to correctly answered non-conflict items (Brisson et al., 
2018; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys et al., 2010, 
2011, 2013; Frey et al., 2018). This finding is validated through different indirect 
measures on various reasoning tasks (see e.g. De Neys, 2014, 2018). In the present 
study, group-level conflict detection was also observed - mean confidence ratings 
were somewhat lower for conflict incorrect in comparison to non-conflict correct 
responses. 
Recently, calls for exploration of potential benefits of individual difference 
perspective on conflict detection have emerged (see e.g. De Neys, 2014; De Neys & 
Bonnefon, 2013), mainly driven by findings that conflict detection is not ubiquitous 
(e.g. Pennycook et al., 2012), and that biased reasoners are less sensitive to conflict 
detection (e.g. Mata et al., 2014; Mevel et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
However, asking if there are individual differences in conflict detection (i.e. is 
conflict detection indeed flawless/perfect) is not the same as asking whether those 
who miss to detect conflict also fail to provide a correct answer. In general, it is 
possible that individual differences in conflict detection do exist, while the most 
biased reasoners still show some sensitivity to conflict. The results of the present 
study seem to be in accordance with such possibility. Although a considerable 
variability of conflict detection scores was registered, these variations were not 
related to variability in response accuracy. However, a null result could also be due 
to other reasons.  
Variability between participants concerning intra-individual fluctuations of 
confidence rating scores could be seen as a potential source of error variance. It could 
be argued that the same nominal decrease (or increase) in confidence brings different 
information depending on the general stability of confidence for a given participant. 
In other words, the difference should weigh more when a subject had relatively stable 
confidence ratings than when s/he showed a greater variation of confidence ratings 
across items. For this reason, raw difference scores were divided by standard 
deviation of individual confidence ratings across items. As an added benefit, 
participants who showed no variability were excluded from further analyses (instead 
to be classified as showing no conflict detection). Nevertheless, not even "cohen-d-
ized" conflict detection measures were related to response accuracy.  
Null result could also be due to differences in logic complexity between the 
tasks employed in the present study. Logical intuitions are hypothesized to be 
bounded to non-complex conditions, meaning that they are expected to arise only for 
relatively simple problems which can be solved by using basic normative principles 
(De Neys, 2012, 2014). As Stanovich (2018) argue, probability of successful 
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detection strongly depends on mindware instantiation. Recently, Brisson et al. (2018) 
demonstrated group-level conflict detection only for MP and MT syllogisms (easy 
problems), but not for DA and AC syllogisms (hard problems). Our data confirm 
such finding - conflict was implicitly detected in the case of valid unbelievable MP 
and MT items (non-conflict correct M = 93.05, conflict incorrect M = 85.56, t = -7.68, 
df = 183, p < .001), but not in the case of invalid believable DA and AC items, where 
reversed situation was detected (non-conflict correct M = 88.23, conflict incorrect M 
= 91.11, t = 3.68, df = 227, p < .001). Additionally, measures of conflict detection 
were not related to response accuracy on corresponding items in the case of hard 
tasks (r(211) = -.06, p = .38), but they were in the case of easy ones (r(171) = .26, p 
< .001). In other words, not only that group-level conflict detection findings are 
dependent on task complexity, but it seems that also is the case with individual-
difference results. When the underlying principle is relatively simple, individual 
differences in activation of logical intuitions about the given problem might arise 
leading to differences in sensitivity to conflict between logic and intuition, which 
serves as a signal for initiating type 2 processing, which then affects their 
performance on conflict syllogisms. Such moderating effect of task complexity can 
be used to explain inconsistencies in results of previous studies (Frey et al., 2018; 
Swan et al., 2018), but also to enhance our understanding of conditions in which 
meta-cognitive monitoring operates (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017).  
Potential predictive capacity of indirect measures of cognitive decoupling was 
tested as well. Two differences in regard to previous operationalization of this 
capacity (Pennycook et al., 2015; Swan et al., 2018) should be noted. First, 
confidence ratings for conflict incorrect responses (and not for non-conflict tasks 
irrespective of response accuracy) were used as a baseline. Consequently, differences 
between implicit measures related to successful and unsuccessful overriding of 
heuristic intuitive response were captured. Similarity of proposed cognitive 
decoupling measures and measures of monitoring resolution (Koriat, 2012) should 
be noted. This measure indicates a degree of metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. one's 
ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect responses, and as such it should 
reflect the ability to sustain decoupled representations of problem task in order to 
accomplish required mental operations. Moreover, results have shown that these 
measures are positively (and not negatively) related to response accuracy, even after 
controlling for individual differences in intelligence and cognitive reflection. Further 
on, cognitive decoupling and conflict detection measures were positively related 
indicating that implicit apprehension of clash between intuitive responses was in 
relation to a more successful override of heuristic response.  
It should be noted that the generalizability of the results reported in this study is 
limited, considering that only syllogistic reasoning tasks were employed. Moreover, 
only four out of the 512 possible tasks were translated into items. Besides that, 
individual measures of conflict detection are known to be fairly noisy (De Neys, 
2018; Frey & De Neys, 2017; Frey et al., 2018), and relatively low level of internal 




consistency of response accuracy scores should be noted. One of possible solution 
for these problems is to collect various indirect measures (e.g. response time, 
measures of skin conductance, time of fixation of critical parts of task, etc.) on several 
reasoning tasks on which conflict between normative rule and "stronger" intuitive 
response is pronounced (e.g. bat-and-ball, base-rate, and ratio-bias tasks). First 
attempts in that direction are already made. The results of these studies indicate a 
certain level of convergence of multiple conflict detection indexes across several 
tasks (Frey et al., 2018). However, additional research is needed in order to reach a 
more conclusive understanding of their generalizability (cf. Frey & De Neys, 2017). 
If the results turn out to be positive, it could be additionally examined whether 
sensitivity to conflict detection is correlated with traditional psychometric constructs 
(De Neys, 2018). It seems that at least some of the future individual difference studies 
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